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This article examines multiple cases from the Court of Justice of the European Communities
regarding national anti-competitive legislation and the need for the Court to gradually lay down
rules of law.
NATIONAL ANTI-COMPETITIVE
LEGISLATION AND COMMUNITY LAWt
ReniJoliet*
INTRODUCTION
In INNO v. A TAB,' the Court of Justice of the European
Communities (the "Court") established that Article 5 of the
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (the
"Treaty") 2 imposes an obligation on the Member States of the
Community not to detract from the effectiveness of Article 853
of the Treaty.' It is only since 1984, however, that the Court
has tackled the problem of national anti-competitive legislation
directly. I must confess that for a variety of reasons I have al-
ways been fascinated by this problem. First, the need to safe-
guard competition is the most effective way of ensuring that
traders serve the public interest while pursuing their own par-
ticular interests. Second, because of the absence of specific
regulatory provisions, the Court is required to lay down rules
of law gradually. As a professor, the possibility of observing
this process is in itself passionately interesting. Finally, it is a
field in which fruitful comparisons can be made with the laws
of the United States.
Moreover, the subject also has given rise to valuable and
vigorous discussion. I need only recall the detailed and care-
fully pondered study of my eminent former colleague, Judge
Pierre Pescatore, and the response that it evoked from an ad-
viser to the Commission, Giuliano Marenco.5
t A version of this Article will be published in 1988 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. (B.
Hawk ed. 1989). Copyright © Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., 1989.
* Judge, Court of Justice of the European Communities, Luxembourg; Profes-
sor, University of Liege. The author wishes to express his thanks to P.H. Galezowski,
Lawyer-Linguist at the Court of Justice of the European Communities.
1. INNO v. ATAB, Case 13/77, 1977 E.C.R. 2115, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8442.
2. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art.
5, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I1) at 4 (official English version), 298
U.N.T.S. 11, 17 (unofficial English trans.) [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
3. Id. art. 85, at 32-33, 298 U.N.T.S. at 47.
4. INNO, 1977 E.C.R. at 2145, 33, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8442, at 7989.
5. See Pescatore, Public and Private Aspects of European Community Competition Law,
10 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 373 (1987) [hereinafter Pescatore, EEC Competition Law];
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The case law has since been enriched by several judg-
ments in this area, which, like earlier judgments in this area,
were given in proceedings concerning questions submitted for
a preliminary ruling by national courts dealing with disputes in
which a private trader, prosecuted by a public authority or
sued by a competitor for infringing a national measure, argued
in his defense that such a measure was incompatible with Arti-
cles 3(o6 5, and 85 when viewed in conjunction with one an-
other.7 Although the Commission intervened in those pro-
ceedings in order to submit observations, it has yet to bring an
action under Article 169 of the Treaty.8 In other words, the
Commission, which has in recent years multiplied dramatically
Marenco, Competition Between National Economies and Competition Between Businesses-a Re-
sponse to Judge Pescatore, 10 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 420 (1987) [hereinafter Marenco, Re-
sponse]; Pescatore, European Community Competition Law-a Rejoinder by Judge Pescatore, 10
FORDHAM Ir'L L.J. 444 (1987). Other articles on the topic include: Galmot & Bian-
carelli, Les Riglementations Nationales en Matire de Prix au Regard du Droit Communautaire,
21 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPfEN 269 (1985); Marenco, Effets des Rgles
Communautaires de Concurrence (Art. 85 et 86) sur l'Activiti des Etats Membres, in DISCRE-
TIONARY POWERS OF THE MEMBER STATES IN THE FIELD OF ECONOMIC POLICIES AND
THEIR LIMITS UNDER THE EEC TREATY 53 U. Schwarze ed. 1988) [hereinafter
Marenco, Rigles Communautaires]; Marenco, Government Action and Antitrust in the United
States: What Lessons for Community Law?, 1987/1 LEGAL ISSUES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRA-
TION 1; Marenco, Le Trait CEE Interdit-il aux Etats Membres de Restreindre la Concurrence?,
1986 CAHIERS DE DROIT EUROPEEN 285 [hereinafter Marenco, Traiti CEE]; Pap-
palardo, Der Europdische Gerichtshof auf der Suche nach einem Kriterium fdr die Anwendung
der Wettbewerbsregeln auf Staatliche Massnahmen, in EINE ORDNUNGSPOLITIK FUR EUROPA:
FESTSCHRIFT F0R HANS VON DER GROEBEN 303 (1987); van der Esch, The System of
Undistorted Competition of Article 3(f) of the EEC Treaty and the Duty of Member States to
Respect the Central Parameters Thereof, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 409 (1988); van der Esch,
Der Stellenwert des Unverfdlschten Wettbewerbs in der Rechtsprechung des Europdschen Gericht-
shofes und der Verwaltungspraxis der Kommission, 1988 WIRTSCHAF'r UND WETrBEWERB
563; D. Waelbroeck, Application des Rigles de Concurrence du Trait! de Rome dI lAutorit
Publique, 303 REVUE DU MARCHt COMMUN 25 (1987); M. Waelbroeck, Les Rapports En-
tre les Rgles sur la Libre Circulation des Marchandises et les Rigles de Concurrence Applicables
aux Entreprises dans la CEE, in Du DROIT INTERNATIONAL AU DROIT DE L'INTtGRATION
781 (F. Capotori ed. 1987) [hereinafter Waelbroeck, Les Rapports Entre]. Each of the
judgments of the Court dealt with in this article have, in addition, been the subject of
several commentaries that will not be referred to individually.
6. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 3(f), 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 3-4, 298
U.N.T.S. at 16.
7. See, e.g., BNIC v. Aubert, Case 136/86, 1987 E.C.R. - (Judgment of Decem-
ber 3, 1987) (LEXIS, Eurcom library, Cases file); Vereniging van Vlaamse Reis-
bureaus v. Sociale Dienst van de Plaatselijke en Gewestelijke Overheidsdiensten,
Case 311/85, 1987 E.C.R. -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,499 [hereinafter VVR].
8. Article 169 provides:
If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfill an
obligation under this Treaty, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the mat-
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the number of proceedings it has instituted against Member
States for failure to fulfill their obligations, has never taken the
initiative to directly challenge a Member State for enacting
anti-competitive legislation.9
The realities of economic life produce widely differing sit-
uations that defy abstract and general definitions. To state
that it amounts to determining the limits of the Member States'
legislative power in the economic sphere'0 or to explain that
"effects of virtually all economic legislation are comparable to
those of an agreement in restraint of trade"' " is a distortion.
The problem must be defined in concrete terms.
May the Member States encourage ' undertakings to con-
clude agreements that are prohibited? Are they authorized to
impose over an entire sector minimum prices or maximum
production quotas that have been agreed to by only some un-
dertakings operating in that sector? Are they entitled to adopt
legislation prohibiting or penalizing price competition,
whether or not such legislation incorporates private agree-
ments? Are they free to empower traders to prohibit certain
conduct in the market when the agreements that those traders
would conclude in order to achieve such prohibition would be
manifestly contrary to Article 85? These are the real ques-
tions.
Short-term economic policy measures, such as imposing
price controls by fixing maximum prices in the hope of holding
down inflation and guaranteeing the income of consumers, are
not involved in any way.' 2 In all cases where the Court was
requested to make an assessment on the basis of Articles 3(0,
5, and 85 of the Treaty, the contested legislation was intended
ter after giving the State concerned the opportunity to submit its observa-
tions.
If the State concerned does not comply with the opinion within the pe-
riod laid down by the Commission, the latter may bring the matter before
the Court ofJustice.
EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 169, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 56-57, 298 U.N.T.S.
at 75.
9. In 1985, the Commission stated that it would devote "its best efforts to ensur-
ing that the Member States adhere to the principle of free competition in general and
the principles enshrined in Article 85 and 86 in particular." Comm'n, Fifteenth Re-
port on Competition Policy 93 (1985).
10. See Marenco, Traiti CEE, supra note 5, at 285.
11. Marenco, Response, supra note 5, at 421.
12. But see id.; Waelbroeck, Les Rapports Entre, supra note 5, at 795-96.
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to protect certain traders from competition on the part of
other traders, thereby adversely affecting the interests of con-
sumers in the short-term. It was competition and not the free
movement of goods that lay at the heart of the problem. The
provisions establishing the free movement of goods enabled
only certain aspects of the contested legislation to be. ad-
dressed.' 3 Moreover, the exclusive application of those provi-
sions would lead to an unacceptable difference in treatment
between products and services.4
All the judgments given by the Court in this area, with the
exception of Cullet/Leclerc,15 were delivered by the full Court,
demonstrating the importance that the Court attaches to these
cases. The development of the Court's doctrine can best be
understood by considering the case law in chronological order.
I. THE JUDGMENT IN INNO
The origin of all the case law developments in this area
can be found in paragraphs 31 and 33 of the judgment in
INNO. 16 There, the Court stated that "the Treaty imposes a
duty on Member States not to adopt or maintain in force any
measure which could deprive [Article 86] of its effectiveness" ' 17
and that "Member States may not enact measures enabling pri-
vate undertakings to escape the constraints imposed by Arti-
cles 85 to 94 of the Treaty." ''"
The legislation in question, submitted to the Court by the
Belgian Court of Cassation, involved a prohibition on the sale
of cigarettes to consumers at a price lower than that stated on
the tax label affixed to the packet. The provision, which was
13. In Leclerc/Au B1I6 Vert, Case 229/63, 1985 E.C.R. 1, 33-36, 21-31, Com-
mon Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,111, at 15,436-37, the application of Articles 30 and 36
enabled only the external aspect of the French law at issue to be dealt with, namely
the obligation to charge the price imposed, even in the case of books published in
France and imported from another Member State, and the obligation incumbent on
the principal distributor of books published abroad to fix the retail price thereof.
14. Clearly, the measures contested in Minist~re Public v. Asjes, Joined Cases
209-213/84, 1986 E.C.R. 1425, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,287, and VVR, supra
note 7, would have remained outside the scope of Community law if the Court had
not focused on the application of the principles embodied in Articles 3(f), 5, and 85.
15. Case 231/83, 1985 E.C.R. 305, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,139; see infra
notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
16. Case 13/77, 1977 E.C.R. 2115, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8442.
17. Id. at 2144, 31, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8442, at 7989.
18. Id. at 2145, 33, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8442, at 7989.
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applicable to both the imported and domestically manufac-
tured products, had the effect of imposing on all persons, in-
cluding traders not bound by contractually agreed prices, the
selling price fixed by the manufacturers or the importers.
The Belgian court might have been better advised to raise
the problem from the point of view of Article 85 and Articles
3(f) and 5. The market was characterized by the fact that sev-
eral manufacturers were operating in it, and the factor elimi-
nated by the legislation was intrabrand competition. In that
regard, like the French law on the selling price of books dis-
cussed below,' 9 the legislation gave private traders the means
to implement unilaterally a policy of imposing minimum resale
prices.
The two paragraphs of the judgment quoted from above
were not incorporated in the operative part, which does not
roundly condemn the system but would appear to leave some
discretion to national courts. Those paragraphs were capable
of being interpreted in different ways and left the door open to
fresh developments. Before their potential was discovered,
however, eight years elapsed and the validity of the French law
on the selling price of books came before the Court.
II. THE JUDGMENT IN LECLERC
A. Context of the Case
In Leclerc/Au BlW Vert,20 the Court examined the 1981
French law on book prices, named the "Lang" law after Jac-
ques Lang, then French Minister of Culture, requiring all pub-
lishers or importers of books to fix a minimum retail price.2 '
The Lang law also required booksellers to charge an effective
price for sales to the public of between ninety-five and one
hundred percent of the retail fixed price.2 2 Booksellers and as-
sociations of booksellers that charged the prices laid down
could seek an injunction against, and claim penalty payments
or damages from, booksellers who failed to comply with the
19. See infra notes 20-51 and accompanying text.
20. Case 229/83, 1985 E.C.R. I, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,111.
21. See Law No. 81-766 of Aug. 10, 1981, 1981 JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUB-
LIQUE FRANgAISE [.0.] 2198.
22. See id.
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law.23 The law even provided for the possibility of imposing
criminal penalties for infringements by recalcitrant booksell-
ers.
2 4
According to the French government-and here I refer to
the Court's summary of the arguments-
such legislation is necessary both in order to conserve spe-
cialist booksellers in the face of competition from other dis-
tribution channels which rely on a policy of reduced mar-
gins and a limited range of titles and in order to prevent a
small number of large distributors from being able to im-
pose their will on publishers to the detriment of poetic, sci-
entific and creative works. 25
The Lang law, according to the French government, was an
essential measure for the protection of books as a cultural me-
dium.
It must be remembered, in addition, that in most of the
other Member States there were agreements concluded be-
tween publishers and retailers that fell within the scope of an
automatic and specific derogating provision of the law of the
Member State on restrictive practices or that had given rise to
individual decisions granting authorization or exemption.26
B. The Commission's Point of View and Brief Comparative Remarks
The Commission, based on its interpretation of INNO, re-
quested the Court to declare that Articles 3(0, 5, and 85 did
not deprive Member States of all power to interfere in the eco-
nomic sphere, particularly with freedom of competition. 27 Ac-
cording to the Commission, the duty of Member States not to
detract from the effectiveness of Article 85 precluded only
three types of conduct: (i) prescribing, promoting, or facilitat-
ing the conclusion of prohibited agreements; (ii) heightening
the impact of such agreements by inducing third parties who
had neither negotiated nor accepted the agreement of their
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. Leclerc/Au BI Vert, Case 229/83, 1985 E.C.R. 1, 32, 16, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 14,111, at 15,435.
26. See, e.g., Neufassung des Gesetzes Gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen,
§ 16, 1980 BUNDESGESETZBLATr, TIEL I [BGBI.I] 1761 (W. Ger.); Re Net Book
Agreement, 1957, 3 ALL E.R. 751 (1962).
27. Id. at 24, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,111, at 15,430.
1989] NATIONAL ANTI-COMPETITIVE LEGISLATION 169
own free will to participate therein; and (iii) adopting a State
measure restricting competition with the sole aim of enabling
undertakings to circumvent Articles 85 and 86 without being
able to claim that this was in the public interest.28
The second type of conduct refers to the classic situation
where a state, by an official action (i.e. a law or regulation),
renders compulsory for a whole sector measures agreed upon
among certain undertakings operating in that sector. An illus-
tration is provided by the Belgian Royal Decree of January 13,
1935, which permits the establishment of economic rules regu-
lating production and distribution.29 According to the decree,
any trade association of producers or distributors may request
the extension to all other producers or distributors belonging'
to the same branch of industry or trade of an obligation that it
has assumed of its own free will, with regard to production,
distribution, sale, exportation, or importation.3 0 For those
purposes, the producers or distributors who assume that obli-
gation must represent an absolute majority of the interests in-
volved in that branch of industry or trade.3 '
What is envisaged by the other two types of conduct de-
scribed is more difficult to visualize in concrete terms. This is
particularly true of the third type, which is based on a re-
stricted form of wording used in INNO.32 The first type, in-
volving the concept of agreement, implies that something is
freely undertaken, which is to be contrasted with coercion by
the State. Furthermore, the expression "to encourage the con-
clusion of agreements" would have been more precise than
that of "promoting" or "facilitating" conduct.
According to the Commission, before the conduct of a
Member State can be prohibited, it is necessary first to identify
a certain type of corporate behavior, specifically concerted ac-
tion that itself falls within the scope of the prohibition laid
28. Comm'n, Fifteenth Report on Competition Policy 92 (1985).
29. Royal Decree No. 62 of Jan. 13, 1935, 1935 MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] 229.
30. Id. art. 1.
31. Id.
32. Compare Leclerc/Au B16 Vert, Case 229/83, 1985 E.C.R. 1, 24-25, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,111, at 15,430 (stating the Commission's view) with INNO v.
ATAB, Case 13/77, 1977 E.C.R. 2115, 2145, 33, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
8442, at 7989 (stating the Court's view).
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down in Article 85.33 In the circumstances of Leclerc, the Com-
mission maintained, there was no such corporate behavior.34
The Lang law had empowered the publishers to determine uni-
laterally the retail prices and provided them the means of en-
suring compliance without having to enter into agreements
with the booksellers.3 5
The Commission, in choosing the terms that it used to
define the types of restrictive conduct, may have been guided
by a case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. In Rice v.. Wil-
liams,36 the Supreme Court stated:
[A] state statute, when considered in the abstract, may be
condemned under the antitrust laws only if it mandates or
authorizes conduct that necessarily constitutes a violation of
the antitrust laws in all cases, or if it places irresistible pres-
sure on a private party to violate the antitrust laws in order
to comply with the statute.
37
The Supreme Court pointed out, in particular, that the law in
question "does not require the distiller to impose vertical re-
straints of any kind; that is a matter for it to determine. '3 8
The Supreme Court's decision in California Retail Liquor
Dealers v. Midcal Aluminum shows that the conclusion of agree-
ments is not required.39 In Midcal, the Supreme Court found
in favor of a distributor who had been prosecuted for reselling
alcoholic beverages in breach of a legislative provision, essen-
tially identical to the Lang law, requiring growers and whole-
salers to publish schedules of prices and prohibiting retailers
from selling beverages at prices lower than those specified.4 °
33. See Leclerc, 1985 E.C.R. at 22, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,111, at
15,428-29.
34. See id. at 22, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,111, at 15,429.
35. See id. at 22-23, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,111, at 15,429.
36. 458 U.S. 654 (1982).
37. Id. at 661.
38. Id. at 662 (emphasis in original).
39. 445 U.S. 97 (1980). This comes out quite clearly in a subsequent Supreme
Court decision, 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 345-46 n.8 (1987).
40. The statute provided:
Each wine grower, wholesaler licensed to sell wine, wine rectifier, and recti-
fier shall:
(a) Post a schedule of selling prices of wine to retailers or consumers
for which his resale price is not governed by a fair trade contract made by
the person who owns or controls the brand.
(b) Make and file a fair trade contract and file a schedule of resale
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The key passage in Midcal is the following reference to
earlier case law:
*These decisions establish two standards for antitrust immu-
nity under Parker v. Brown. First, the challenged restraint
must be "one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed
as state policy"; second, the policy must be "actively super-
vised" by the State itself. The California system for wine
pricing satisfies the first standard. The legislative policy is
forthrightly stated and clear in its purpose to permit resale
price maintenance. The program, however, does not meet
the second requirement for Parker immunity. The State
simply authorizes price-setting and enforces the prices es-
tablished by private parties. The State neither establishes
prices nor reviews the reasonableness of the price, sched-
ules; nor does it regulate the terms of fair trade contracts.
The State does not monitor market conditions or engage in
any "pointed reexamination" of the program. The national
policy in favor of competition cannot be thwarted by casting
such a gauzy cloak of state involvement over what is essen-
tially a private price-fixing arrangement.4 1
C. The Position of the Court and the Criticism Leveled Against It
Whatever the merits of these comparisons to U.S. case
law, the Court in Leclerc partially upheld the Commission's po-
sition by noting that the Lang law did not require the conclu-
sion of agreements that were prohibited.42 The Court then
pointed out that legislation like the Lang law rendered corpo-
rate behavior of the type prohibited by Article 85(1) superflu-
ous by making book publishers or importers responsible for
freely fixing binding retail prices.43
The Court then raised the question of whether legislation
like the Lang law detracted from the effectiveness of Article 85
and was, therefore, contrary to the second paragraph of Article
5 of the Treaty.44 One legal writer has considered that the rea-.
prices, if he owns or controls a brand of Wine resold to retailers or consum-
ers.
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 24866 (West 1964), repinted in Midcal, 445 U.S. at 99 n.I.
41. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105-06 (footnotes and citation omitted).
42. Leclerc/Au Bl Vert, Case 229/83, 1985 E.C.R. 1, 31-32, 15, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,111, at 15,435.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 32-33, 15-20, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,111, at 15,435-36.
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soning underlying the Court's response to this question. chal-
lenged the very principle of State interference in the economic
sphere, that such reasoning did not entail any consequences
and was to some extent stillborn, and finally that it was difficult
to avoid the impression that such reasoning was a concession
to a minority view, thus constituting, as it were, a "dissenting
opinion."'45 Those assessments are incorrect.
First, the Court did not disapprove of all legislation that,
by eliminating competition between undertakings, renders the
conclusion of agreements superfluous. It simply raised an ob-
jection in principle to the adoption of legislation in which the
State gives up its role and confers on undertakings the powers
required to give effect to their policy. In other words, under-
takings must either operate under the supervision of the public
authorities or be subject to market rules, but they must not be
entrusted with the powers of a public authority, since they only
represent specific interests.
Second, the Court's judgment lays down side-by-side two
different principles that permit national legislation to be re-
garded as incompatible with Article 5. One principle is taken
in part from the position defended by the Commission. 46 The
other principle comes close to that laid down by the Supreme
Court in Midcal.47 The "dissent," therefore, would appear to
be a figment of a disappointed critic's imagination. As the
Commission's viewpoint was inapplicable, the Court consid-
ered whether the contested law was open to criticism on the
basis of the other principle.48
Finally, contrary to the view taken by certain legal writ-
ers,49 the Court has not left open or unanswered the question
of the constitutionality of legislation like the Lang law. The
reasoning concerning the specific circumstances of Leclerc sug-
gests the Court considered a law such as the Lang law con-
trary, in principle, to the obligation resulting from Articles
3(f), 5, and 85 of the Treaty. The Commission had not exer-
cised its power in relation to the purely national resale price
45. See Marenco, Traiti CEE, supra note 5, at 294, 297.
46. See Leclerc, 1985 E.C.R. at 33, 20, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,111, at
15,436.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 34-35, 25, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,111, at 15,436-37.
49. See, e.g., Waelbroeck, Les Rapports Entre, supra note 5, at 792.
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maintenance agreements that existed in other Member States
in the book sector. Accordingly, the obligations incumbent on
the Member States not to enact measures similar to the Lang
law were not yet sufficiently specific. This is why the Court
came to a negative conclusion "as Community law stands." 50
Like my colleague Judge Yves Galmot and his law clerkJacques
Biancarelli, 5" I take the view that the Court reached that con-
clusion essentially on grounds of legal certainty.
III. THE JUDGMENT IN CULLET
A. Context of the Case
In Cullet,52 another set of French rules, this time fixing a
minimum retail price for fuel, was challenged by a supermar-
ket.53 According to the French government, the purpose of
the rules was to guarantee fuel supplies throughout the na-
tional territory with sufficient profit margins for retailers.
Thus, the rules protected a distribution sector, namely that of
small petrol stations, against the pricing policy pursued by su-
permarkets.
After repeating the principal grounds of the judgment in
Leclerc, the Court pointed out that the contested rules en-
trusted the public authorities with responsibility for fixing
prices.54 The Court came to the conclusion that such rules did
not deprive Article 85 of its effectiveness in breach of Articles
3(f) and 5.55
B. Some Reactions of Legal Writers
The Court, as a certain perceptive commentator has
rightly surmised 5 6 made its assessments in Cullet and Leclerc de-
pendent on the degree of regulation by the public authorities.
Another observer has pointed out that there was no justifica-
tion for treating the two cases differently, as the difference in
the degree of interference on the part of the public authorities
50. See Leclerc, 1985 E.C.R. at 33, 20, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) $ 14,111, at
15,436.
51. See Galmot & Biancarelli, supra note 5, at 306.
52. Case 231/83, 1985 E.C.R. 305, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,139.
53. Id. at 316-18, $$ 3-8, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,139, at 15,744.
54. Id. at 320, 17, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,139, at 15,746.
55. Id. at 319-20, $$ 16-17, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) $ 14,139, at 15,745-46.
56. See Pappalardo, supra note 5, at 314.
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was itself connected with the nature of the product. In the
case of heterogeneous products, such as books, the legislature,
wishing to eliminate competition among retailers, was com-
pelled to rely on the manufacturers (i.e. the publishers), be-
cause it was unable to fix the prices itself. In the case of a ho-
mogeneous product such as fuel, the legislature was able to fix
prices itself. The observer added, however, that from the
point of view of competition, there are even more reasons for
challenging legislation of the type adopted for fuel than legis-
lation of the type adopted for books, since the former elimi-
nates all competition while the latter merely abolishes intra-
brand competition.58
This observation is not unfounded, and the only possible
answer is that the effect on competition is not the criterion
adopted by the Court, nor, moreover, is that the criterion ad-
vocated by the Commission.
IV. THE JUDGMENTS IN BNIC V. CLAIR
AND BNIC V. AUBERT
I shall deal with BNIC/Clair59 and BNIC v. Aubert 60 to-
gether, even though an interval of over two years separated the
dates of those judgments. The cases raise the same problems
or entail problems that are closely connected.
A. The Context of the Cases
The Bureau National Interprofessionnel du Cognac (the
"Board"), is an inter-trade organization in the wine and spirits
sector of the Cognac region. The Board was set up by France
at the time of the Vichy regime and its composition and opera-
tion are governed by laws and regulations of the State. 6' The
Board, whose chairman is appointed by the Minister for Agri-
culture, is composed primarily of a number of delegates repre-
senting wine growers, dealers, and commercial distillers. The
delegates, who are appointed by the minister from lists of can-
57. See Marenco, Trait CEE, supra note 5, at 296-97.
58. See id.
59. Case 123/83, 1985 E.C.R. 391, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,160.
60. Case 136/86, 1987 E.C.R. - (Judgment of December 3, 1987) (LEXIS,
Eurcom library, Cases file).
61. Clair, 1985 E.C.R. at 419, 3, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,160, at
15,952-53.
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didates submitted by the trade organizations concerned, are
divided into two groups that-are permitted to conclude agree-
ments.62
The relevant administrative authority is authorized, pursu-
ant to the 1975 law on agricultural inter-trade organizations, 63
to make the agreements generally binding when they are
aimed at promoting the implementation, subject to State con-
trol, of marketing rules, prices, and conditions of payment. e6
When an agreement is made generally binding, it binds all
members of the trades making up the trade organization in the
production area covered by the agreement.65 The prohibition
against restrictive agreements laid down by this French legisla-
tion is inapplicable to agreements made generally binding in
this manner. 66 Penalties are imposed in the event of non-com-
pliance with those agreements.6 7 The Board and each of the
trade organizations composing it may seek a declaration to the
effect that supply contracts concluded in breach of an agree-
ment made generally binding are automatically void.68 The
Board may also claim compensation.6 9
In Clair, a dealer was prosecuted for not complying with
an order that made generally binding an agreement fixing a
minimum purchase price for potable spirits used in the pro-
duction of cognac.7 ° In Aubert, a dealer was challenged by the
Board for exceeding his production quota, thereby violating
the order that made the agreement in question generally bind-
ing.7' It would appear that in both cases the traders concerned
did not belong to the trade organizations that had put forward
candidates for the posts of delegates who were to be responsi-
ble for negotiating and concluding the agreements. The trad-
ers in Clair and Aubert, therefore, had nothing to do with the
62. Id. at 420, 5, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,160, at 15,953.
63. Law No. 75-600 of July 10, 1975, 1975 J.O. 7124.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 7125.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 7124-25.
70. BNIC/Clair, Case 123/83, 1985 E.C.R. 391, 405, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,160, at 15,941.
71. BNIC v. Aubert, Case 136/86, 1987 E.C.R. - (Judgment of December 3,
1987) (LEXIS, Eurcom library, Cases file).
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underlying agreements. The same national court was involved
in both cases. In Clair, the national court focused on the legal-
ity of the agreement itself,72 while in Aubert it focused on the
scope of the measure in question, without specifying whether it
was in the nature of an agreement or a regulation. 73
B. Position of the Court
Because the anti-competitive nature of the measures in
Clair and Aubert was undisputable, the principles laid down by
the Court may be grouped around the only three issues that
were capable of giving rise to any discussion.
1. Was There Any Concerted Action for the Purposes of
Article 85(1) of the Treaty?
In support of its proposal that the question should be an-
swered in the negative, the Board referred to the manner in
which it had been created, the manner in which its members
were appointed, and the rules governing its operations. 4 In
its view, the wine-growers' and dealers' delegates were acting
in pursuance of the terms of reference conferred upon them by
the minister, which were not binding on the undertakings to
which those delegates might belong. Ultimately, the Board it-
self was merely an advisory body that submitted proposals to
the public authorities.75 Only the intervention of those author-
ities made the agreements concluded between the groups in
question binding. Therefore, according to the Board, the
agreement between the groups did not fall within the scope of
Article 85(1), and the order making the agreement generally
binding was a State measure not covered by any rule in the
Treaty.76
In response to these arguments, the Court stated quite
simply that (i) the wine-growers' and dealers' delegates must
be regarded as representing their trade organizations in the
negotiation and conclusion of the agreements, 77 (ii) the fact
that the groups of wine-growers and dealers meet within a
72. Clair, 1985 E.C.R. at 405, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,160, at 15,941-42.
73. Aubert, 1987 E.C.R. at _.
74. Clair, 1985 E.C.R. at 406-07, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,160, at 15,943.
75. Id. at 408, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,160, at 15,944.
76. Id., Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,160, at 15,944.
77. Id. at 423, 19, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,160, at 15,954.
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public organization does not remove their agreements from
the scope of Article 85,78 and (iii) an agreement fixing a mini-
mum price for a product and submitted to public authorities
for the purpose of obtaining approval to make the agreement
binding on all traders in the market in question is intended to
distort competition in that market.79
2. Does Such Concerted Action Still Constitute an
Infringement of Article 85(1) Even After the
Measures that Form the Subject Matter of
Such Action Have Been Made
Generally Binding by an Order to that Effect?
In reply to this question, the Court again gave a positive
answer. It held that even the adoption of the order making the
agreement generally binding did not have the effect of remov-
ing the agreement from the scope of Article 85.80
3. Is the Order Itself, Which Renders the Agreement
Generally Binding, Incompatible with the
Obligation Incumbent on the Member
States not to Detract from the
Effectiveness of Article 85?
In practical terms, this was the decisive issue. First, the
lapse of time between the conclusion of the agreement and the
adoption of the order making it generally binding may be very
short. Second, and this is the essential point, many undertak-
ings did not belong to the trade organizations represented
within the Board. In the absence of an order making the
agreements generally binding, there is no doubt that the
agreements could not have been effectively implemented.
In Aubert, the Court ruled that the order making the agree-
ment in question generally binding was incompatible with Arti-
cle 5. 11 That conclusion could hardly be considered surpris-
ing. In the intervening period, the Court, adopting the Com-
78. Id. at 423, 20, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,160, at 15,954-55.
79. Id. at 423-24, 22, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,160, at 15,955.
80. BNIC v. Aubert, Case 136/86, 1987 E.C.R. - (Judgment of December 3,
1987) (LEXIS, Eurcom library, Cases file).
81. Id. at _.
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mission's point of view, had held in Ministre Public v. Asjes, s 2
that the Member States may not reinforce the effects of anti-
competitive agreements concluded by undertakings, because
this would deprive Article 85 of its effectiveness.83
C. Comparison and Scope of the Judgment
Clair and Aubert involve the classic situation where public
authorities make an agreement that was concluded between
some of the undertakings operating in a given sector binding
on that sector in its entirety. The real difficulty in Clair and
Aubert was that the State itself established the framework for
concerted action and designated the parties involved, in con-
trast to the position taken, for example, by the Belgian Royal
Decree of 1935, which leaves the conclusion of agreements en-
tirely to the initiative of undertakings and their delegates.8 4
The solution adopted by the Court in Clair and Aubert,
however, runs counter to that adopted by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Parker v. Brown.85 In Parker, ten producers were enti-
tled to petition for the establishment of a prorate marketing
plan for any agricultural commodity within a defined produc-
tion zone under the California Agricultural Prorate Act.86 Af-
ter a public hearing, and provided that it was shown that the
program would prevent agricultural waste, a state commission
was authorized to grant the petition.87 The director, with the
approval of the commission, was then required to set up a
committee from among nominees chosen by the producers.88
The committee was required to formulate a program, which
the commission was authorized to approve after another public
hearing.89 If the proposed program, as approved by the com-
mission, was consented to by sixty-five percent of the produ-
cers owning fifty-one percent of the acreage given over to pro-
duction of the regulated crop, the director was required to
82. Joined Cases 209-213/84, 1986 E.C.R. 1425, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,287.
83. Id. at 1471, 71-72, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,287, at 16,780.'
84. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
85. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
86. Act ofJune 5, ch. 754, 1933 Cal. Stat. 1969 (repealed 1967).
87. Parker, 317 U.S. at 346.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 347.
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carry out the program.9"
The Supreme Court stated:
We may assume for the present purposes that the California
prorate program would violate the Sherman Act if it were
organized and made effective solely by virtue of a contract,
combination and conspiracy by private persons, individual
or corporate....
But it is plain that the prorate program here was never
intended to operate by force of individual agreement or
combination. It derived its authority and its efficacy from
the legislative command of the state and was not intended
to operate or become effective without that command. We
find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its
history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a
state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its
legislature....
... Here the state command to the Commission and to
the program committee of the California Prorate Act is not
rendered unlawful by the Sherman Act since, in view of the
latter's words and history, it must be taken to be a prohibi-
tion of individual and not state action. It is the state which
has created the machinery for establishing the prorate pro-
gram. Although the organization of a prorate zone is pro-
posed by producers, and a prorate program, approved by
the Commission, must also be approved by referendum of
producers, it is the state, acting through the Commission,
which adopts the program and which enforces it with penal
sanctions, in the execution of a governmental policy.9 1
In my view, it is wrong to attempt to infer from Clair that
any concerted action intended to influence the public authori-
ties would constitute an agreement or concerted practice pro-
hibited by Article 85(1).92 The agreements that had been con-
cluded within the Board were designed to regulate the behav-
ior of traders in the market, which is not the case with regard
to ordinary conduct that is simply intended to influence the
law-making activity of the State. Therefore, care must be taken
not to convey the impression that, on this point, the Court's
90. Id.
91. Id. at 350-52.
92. Cf. Marenco, Rigles Communautaires, supra note 5, at 62.
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doctrine is the reverse of that adopted by the Supreme Court
in Eastern R. R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight93 and
United Mine Workers v. Pennington."
V. THE JUDGMENT IN ASJES
A. Context of the Case
The judgment in Asjes95 is of interest not only because it
resolved the controversy over the applicability of Articles 85
and 86 to the air transport sector, but also because it con-
cerned the problem of whether State measures are compatible
with Articles 3(f), 5, and 85 of the Treaty.
93. 365 U.S. 127 (1961). In Noerr, the Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference
retained the services of a public relations firm to foster the adoption of laws that were
unfavorable to the trucking industry. The trade association representing the trucking
industry alleged that through the use of the publicity campaign, the Conference con-
spired to restrain trade and monopolize the long-distance freight business in viola-
tion of the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court, in reversing the District Court's judg-
ment, stated:
A construction of the Sherman Act that would disqualify people from taking
a public position on matters in which they are financially interested would
thus deprive the government of a valuable source of information and, at the
same time, deprive the people of their right to petition in the very instances
in which that right may be of the most importance to them. We reject such a
construction of the Act and hold that, at least insofar as the railroads' cam-
paign was directed toward obtaining governmental action, its legality was
not at all affected by any anticompetitive purpose it may have had.
Id. at 139-40.
94. 381 U.S. 657 (1965). In Pennington, the Inited Mine Workers (the "UMW")
sued a coal company for royalty payments due the UMW under the National Bitumi-
nous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950 (the "Agreement"). The coal company cross
claimed that the Agreement was part of a conspiracy between the UMW and the large
coal companies to restrain and monopolize the coal industry in violation of the Sher-
man Act. As evidence of this conspiracy, the coal company pointed to certain con-
tacts made by the UMW and the large coal companies with the Tennessee Valley
Authority and the U.S. Secretary of Labor. Those contacts resulted in the establish-
ment of a minimum wage that the smaller coal companies could not afford. The
Supreme Court, citing to Noerr, stated:
[We] rejected an attempt to base a Sherman Act conspiracy on evidence
consisting entirely of activities of competitors seeking to influence public
officials. The Sherman Act, it was held, was not intended to bar concerted
action of this kind even though the resulting official action damaged other
competitors at whom the campaign was aimed.
... Noerr shields from the Sherman Act a concerted effort to influence
public officials regardless of intent or purpose.
Id. at 669-70.
95. Minist~re Public v. Asjes, Joined Cases 209-213/84, 1986 E.C.R. 1425,
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,287.
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Community air space is not subject to a single controlling
authority. Each Member State retains its sovereignty over the
air space above its territory. The Treaty provides that the free
movement of services in the field of transport is to be gov-
erned by those provisions of the title relating to transport. At
the time of the events in question, Article 8496 of the Treaty, as
it stood prior to the entry into force of Article 16(5) of the
Single European Act, 97 was applicable, requiring unanimity for
the adoption of rules applicable to air transport. Thus, each
Member State controlled access to the market. The mutual
grant of air freedoms (the right to overfly territory, non-com-
mercial landing rights, the right of access and take off for the
purposes of the international carriage of passengers) is regu-
lated by means of bilateral agreements. Those agreements
specify the authorized routes and landings in the signatory
States. They provide that each signatory State is to designate
which airline company is authorized to exercise the rights con-
ferred by the agreement in question. They generally provide
that the tariffs are to be fixed by common accord by the airlines
designated. The agreements also specify that the tariffs fixed
in that manner are to be subject to the approval of the aviation
authorities of each of the signatory States.9 s
Under the relevant French legislation, it is a criminal of-
fense not to submit tariffs to the competent minister for ap-
proval or to depart from tariffs that have been approved. 99 As
the Court pointed out, a decision approving the tariff pro-
posed by an airline has the effect of rendering that tariff bind-
ing on all traders selling tickets for that airline in respect to the
journey specified in the application for approval.
96. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 84, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 31, 298
U.N.T.S. at 47.
97. Single European Act, art. 16(5), O.J. L 169/1, at 7 (1987).
98. See, e.g., the Agreement on Air Transport Between the Kingdom of Belgium
and the Federal Republic of Germany of Apr. 15, 1956, art. 11 (3), 1959 M.B. 5433.
99. See CODE DE L'AvIATION CIVILE [C. Av. CIv.] art. L 330-3 (Fr.) (undertakings,
and the tariffs they charge, must be approved by the Minister for Civil Aviation),
reprinted in Asjes, 1986 E.C.R. at 1454, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,287, at 16,801;
C. Av. Civ. art. R 330-9 (specifying the information to be provided by undertakings,
domestic and foreign, to the Minister for Civil Aviation), reprinted in Asjes, 1986 E.C.R.
at 1455, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,287, at 16,801; C. Av. Civ. art. R 330-15
(specifying the criminal sanctions to be applied to undertakings violating the above
rules), reprinted in Asjes, 1986 E.C.R. at 1455, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,287, at
16,801-02.
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Nouvelles Frontieres, a travel agency that was prosecuted
for selling air tickets at prices lower than the approved prices,
challenged the compulsory approval procedure that led the
Tribunal de Police de Paris (Local Criminal Court) to refer a
question to the Court concerning the compatibility of that pro-
cedure with Community Law.
B. The Position of the Court
The Court first referred to the case law concerning the ob-
ligation incumbent upon the Member States not to deprive Ar-
ticle 85 of its effectiveness.100 The Court then pointed out that
flowing from this obligation a Member State may neither require
nor favor the adoption of agreements, decisions, or concerted
practices contrary to Article 85 or reinforce the effects thereof.'0
Thus, the Court upheld the point of view that the Commission
defended in Leclerc. 0 2
The Court did not deal with the request made to the air-
line companies by the States that were parties to the bilateral
agreements to take concerted action with regard to tariffs,'0" a
request that would in fact appear to be contrary to the obliga-
tion not to detract from the effectiveness of Article 85. The
Court focused its attention, instead, on the approval procedure
that formed the subject of the dispute.'0 4 In this regard, the
Court directed the national court to take account of the nature
of the approved tariffs.' 0 5 If the tariffs were the subjects of
concerted action criticized by the competent national authori-
ties, under Article 88, or by the Commission, under Article
89(2), they may not be approved, since that would reinforce
the effects of prohibited concerted action.' 06 The national
court must, therefore, in those circumstances refrain from im-
posing the penalties provided for by national law.10 7
100. Asjes, 1986 E.C.R. at 1471, 71, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,287, at
16,780.
101. Id. at 1471, 72, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,286, at 16,780.
102. Leclerc/Au B1 Vert, Case 229/83, 1985 E.C.R. 1, 22, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 14,111, at 15,428-29.
103. Asjes, 1986 E.C.R. at 1471, 70, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,287, at
16,780.
104. Id. at 1471, 73, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,287, at 16,780.
105. Id. at 1472, 75, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,287, at 16,780.
106. Id. at 1472, 76, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,287, at 16,780.
107. Id. at 1472, 77, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,287, at 16,780-81.
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C. Explanation and Comparison
The conclusion reached by the Court calls for a word of
explanation. Asjes was decided at a time when no regulation
applying Articles 85 and 86 to the air transport sector had yet
been adopted. Action by the national courts, with the excep-
tion of those that are specifically entrusted with the task of im-
plementing competition law, was, therefore, conditional in the
case of agreements between airline companies, on prior inter-
vention by the competent national authorities, under Article
88, or by the Commission, on the basis of Article 89(2).1o8
Only after such intervention had taken place was it possible for
the national courts to draw from the establishment of an in-
fringement the resulting consequences under civil law.
It would have been paradoxical in those circumstances to
hold that a national court was entitled to set aside the applica-
tion of a national anti-competitive measure under Article 5,
when, in the absence of a prior decision by the competent ad-
ministrative authority, the same court would have had no
power to rule on the applicability of Article 85 to agreements
between airline companies. This is why the Court considered
that the approval procedure and the penalties established by
national law for non-compliance with an approved tariff were
to be disregarded only where the tariff was the result of con-
certed action and where that concerted action had been specifi-
cally held to be in violation of Article 85. Clearly, since the
competent national authorities are' the aviation authorities,
who have been urging airlines for decades to take concerted
action with a view to protecting the interests of national public
companies, they are unlikely to apply Article 85 with particular
zeal. 109
Once again, it may be of interest to compare the judgment
in Asjes with the position adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in
a relatively similar case. In Southern Motor Carriers Rate Confer-
ence v. United States, 10 common carriers operating in four
108. See Bosch v. De Geus, Case 13/62, 1962 E.C.R. 45, 53, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8003, at 7134.
109. Meanwhile, the first regulation applying Articles 85 and 86 to the air trans-
port sector has been adopted by the Council: Council Regulation No. 3975/87, O.J.
L 374/1 (1987) (laying down the procedure for the application of the rules on com-
petition to undertakings in the air transport sector).
110. 471 U.S. 48 (1985).
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southeastern states were prosecuted for taking concerted ac-
tion with regard to the rate proposals for interstate transport
that they were to submit to the public service commissions of
the states concerned." ' I Collective rate-making was authorized
but not made compulsory by these states.' 1 2 The Supreme
Court held that the two-fold criterion governing the applica-
tion of the state immunity doctrine laid down in Midcal was
satisfied." 3 First, the authorization providing for collective
rate-making by the states in question had been affirmatively ex-
pressed as state policy.' Second, the conduct of the parties
was the subject of active supervision by the public service com-
missions that were ultimately responsible for fixing the
rates. 115
If the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Southern Motors
were applied to the challenged practices in Asjes, the opposite
conclusion, it seems, would have been arrived at by the Court.
The Member States had clearly indicated that they preferred a
policy of concerted action. Moreover, they were monitoring
the results by means of an approval procedure.
VI. THE JUDGMENT IN VVR
A. Context of the Case
The Sociale Dienst van de Plaatselijke en Gewestelijke
Overheidsdiensten (the "Sociale Dienst") is the social service
of the Flemish local and regional public services and acts as a
travel agency for employees of those services. It granted its
customers rebates on the price of tours organized by tour op-
erators, passing on to them all or part of the commission nor-
mally paid to it as a travel agency. For that reason, the Associ-
ation of Flemish Travel Agencies, Vereniging van Vlaamse
Reisbureaus (the "VVR"), brought proceedings for a re-
straining order against the Sociale Dienst on the basis of a Bel-
gian law that prohibits any act contrary to fair commercial
practice whereby a trader or tradesman harms or attempts to
harm the trade interests of one or more traders or trades-
111. Id. at 50.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 65-66.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 66.
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men."16 The type of conduct alleged against the Sociale Dienst
had been described as unethical and consequently prohibited
by an agreement concluded in 1963 by the Union of Belgian
Travel Agencies, Union Professionnelle des Agences de Voy-
age Belges (the "UPAV"), which at the time covered the whole
of Belgium, since the VVR was not set up until later.
In 1965, a law was adopted determining the status of
travel agencies. "t7 The law provided, inter alia, that a license is
required to operate as a travel agent and the license may be
suspended or withdrawn if the rules on commercial practices
are not complied with. The rules, like the conditions and the
procedure for the withdrawal of licenses, were promulgated in
a royal decree adopted in June 1966 (the "Royal Decree of
1966") t18 on the basis of the aforesaid law.
The Royal Decree of 1966, which incorporates a provision
of the code of professional conduct drawn up by the UPAV,
established that it is contrary to fair commercial practice for a
travel agency to offer prices and tariffs other than those agreed
or imposed by law, share commissions, give rebates, or offer
advantages, in any form whatsoever, on conditions that are
contrary to customary practice. 1 9
The Royal Decree of 1966, in conjunction with the provi-
sions of the law on commercial practices, conferred on travel
agencies and associations of travel agencies the right to bring
proceedings for a restraining order against their competitors
who refuse to comply with the rules of the trade'. 20
B. Position of the Court
Relying on the principles established in Asjes, the Court
held that the object and effect of the prohibition imposed on
travel agencies by the Royal Decree of 1966 was to reinforce
the effects of agreements or concerted practices that were con-
trary to Article 85.12' Before coming to the conclusion that the
116. See VVR, supra note 7, 1987 E.C.R. at -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
14,499, at 18,701.
117. Law of Apr. 21, 1965, 1965 M.B. 6959.
118. Royal Decree ofJune 30, 1966, 1966 M.B. 7592.
119. See id. art. 22.
120. VVR, supra note 7, 1987 E.C.R. at -_, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,499,
at 18,706.
121. Id. at -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,499, at 18,707.
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Royal Decree of 1966 was incompatible with Articles 3(f), 5,
and 85 of the Treaty, the Court analyzed the effect of such re-
inforcement in the following terms:
First of all, by transforming an originally contractual
prohibition into a legislative provision a provision such as
Article 22 of the Royal Decree of 1966 reinforces the effect
of the agreements in question between the parties, inas-
much as the rule acquires a permanent character and can no
longer be rescinded by the parties. Secondly, by treating
the failure to observe agreed prices and tariffs or the prohi-
bition on the sharing of commissions with clients as con-
trary to fair commercial practice it allows travel agents who
comply with the agreed rules of commercial practice to
bring proceedings for a restraining order against travel
agents who are not party to the agreement and do not com-
ply with those rules. Thirdly, with regard both to parties to
the agreements and to third parties, the possible withdrawal
of the license to operate as a travel agent in the event of
failure to observe the agreed rules of commercial practice
constitutes a highly effective sanction.' 22
C. Interpretation of the Judgment
The judgment in VVR does not relate to a situation involv-
ing the adoption of an official measure where the public au-
thorities impose on a whole sector the obligations resulting
from an agreement between only some of the undertakings op-
erating in that sector. A measure of that kind presupposes the
maintenance of the agreement. If the agreement lapses, the
measure in question would no longer appear to serve any pur-
pose. In fact, the Royal Decree of 1966 incorporated provi-
sions of the agreement, thereby making the agreement super-
fluous. Moreover, it was by no means clear from the docu-
ments before the Court that an agreement similar to that
adopted by the UPAV had been concluded by the VVR.
When the Court stated that "legislative provisions or reg-
ulations" of the Member State that "reinforce the effects of
agreements"'' 23 were contrary to Article 85, it must be under-
stood to mean any legislative provision or regulation that in-
122. Id. at -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,499, at 18,708.
123. Id.
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corporates the provisions of agreements concluded between
traders and that makes compliance with the agreement com-
pulsory for everyone.
CONCLUSION
Even if the contested State measure was considered in-
compatible with Community law in only one of the seven judg-
ments analyzed above, it is already possible to draw some very
definite conclusions from these cases.
First, national anti-competitive legislation does not, by vir-
tue of its nature, fall outside the scope of the competition rules
of the Treaty. Such legislation may come within the scope of a
prohibition resulting from the combined application of Arti-
cles 3(f), 5, and 85 of the Treaty.
Second, on two occasions the Court has expressly en-
dorsed the Commission's point of view and held that a Mem-
ber State may not "require or favor the adoption of agree-
ments, decisions or concerted practices contrary to Article 85
or to reinforce the effects thereof."'' 24
Third, the Court, however, has not confined the circum-
stance of reinforcing the effects of agreements to the classic
situation in which a measure restricting competition and
adopted within a trade association is made compulsory ("gen-
erally binding") for the whole of the sector concerned. The
judgment in VVR must be interpreted as disapproving of any
regulation that incorporates the terms of an agreement and
thereby renders the maintenance of that agreement superflu-
ous.
Fourth, the Court, unlike the Commission, has indicated
that it is hostile in principle to legislative provisions or regula-
tions that confer on traders the means to pursue an anti-com-
petitive policy without having to enter into agreements. The
Court has not, therefore, entrenched itself behind the mini-
malist approach advocated by the Commission in Leclerc and
has, moreover, applied in a broad fashion the criteria sug-
gested by the Commission.
Finally, the fact remains that, essentially, the criterion of
124. Ministre Public v. Asjes, Joined Cases 209-213/84, 1986 E.C.R. 1425,
1471, 72, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,287, at 16,780; VVR, supra note 7, 1987
E.C.R. at -, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,499, at 18,707.
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the constitutionality of the national anti-competitive measures
that was adopted by the Court lays emphasis on the existence
of agreements previously concluded between undertakings to
which the State lends its support. In light of the case law, it is
not the effects of a particular measure on competition that are
decisive in themselves. Clearly, from a substantive point of
view, it is difficult to perceive a difference between a situation
in which national legislation incorporates an agreement, as in
VVR, and a situation in which legislation of the same kind is
directly adopted by the public authorities, whether under pres-
sure from the representatives of a given sector or otherwise.
